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Martin Neil Baily and Eric Zitzewitz
10.1 Introduction
Output per hour in the nonfarm business sector grew at only 1.4 percent
per year in 1973–95, with the weakness apparently concentrated in the
service sector. Stagnant productivity in services seemed to belie the rapid
adoption of information technology in this sector and the rapid pace of
change in many service industries.
This puzzle, together with the parallel concern about measuring the cost
of living, fueled eﬀorts to improve price and hence productivity measure-
ment. The measurement improvements that have been instituted at the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) resulted in an upward revision of 0.3 percentage in the rate of
output per hour growth in the nonfarm business sector (from 1.1 to 1.4
percent). Moreover, starting in 1996 overall labor productivity growth ac-
celerated sharply to around 3 percent per year, with the acceleration oc-
curring in both service-producing industries and goods-producing indus-
tries (see the disussion in Council of Economic Advisers 2001).
There remain questions, however, about how well service sector output
is being measured, and these questions apply to services sold both for ﬁnal
use and for intermediate use. Measurement errors in the former af-
fect estimates of both industry level and overall output and productiv-
ity, whereas errors in the latter aﬀect only our understanding of produc-
tivity by industry. Despite the overall improvement in service sector
4191. There is concern that eﬀorts to improve measurement may be biased because most
researchers are looking for reasons that output and productivity are understated, whereas in
practice it is possible that quality has deteriorated in some service industries. We are aware
of this problem, but in general we ﬁnd that successful service sector innovations must drive
out existing providers, so the presumption is that industry evolution is generating consumer
surplus as people choose the new combination of price and service quality.
2. See the reference list for the speciﬁc citations. The number of people working on these
projects is too numerous to mention each individually. Bill Lewis, the director of the Mc-
Kinsey Global Institute, has supervised all of the projects.
productivity growth, data anomalies remain, including sectors where re-
ported productivity is declining.1
Starting with an international comparison of service sector productiv-
ity published in 1992, there have been a series of projects initiated by
the McKinsey Global Institute and carried out in collaboration with Mc-
Kinsey & Company oﬃces worldwide and a number of academic econ-
omists.2 Although the emphasis of these projects has been to measure and
explain productivity by industry by country for a range of service sector
and goods-producing industries, another important concern has been with
employment creation and the extent to which productivity increases will
cause or alleviate unemployment.
The purpose of this paper is to ask whether the results of these interna-
tional comparisons cast any light on the problem of service sector output
measurement. To do this, we present case studies of ﬁve service industries:
retail banking, public transport, telecom, retailing, and airlines. We de-
scribe how we have measured output and what we believe are the main
explanations for the resulting cross-country productivity diﬀerences. To
make one point clear at the outset, these studies have not generally devel-
oped new output measures. The basic output measures in the ﬁve cases
are the BLS index of retail banking output; vehicle kilometers in public
transport; access lines and call minutes in telecom; value added in retail-
ing; and revenue passenger kilometers (RPK) for airlines. In selecting out-
put measures, the goal has been to ﬁnd metrics that are intuitive and un-
derstandable to noneconomists, and business consultants in particular,
and that are at least acceptable to economists. Where possible, we have
had a strong preference for physical output measures in goods-producing
sectors, such as liters of beer. We also have used similar tangible output
measures for services, such as call minutes of telecom services used.
Where our eﬀorts may help improve the measurement process is by pro-
viding an understanding of how these industries have evolved (because the
cross section allows us to see industries at diﬀerent stages of evolution);
how innovations have been used to generate customer value; and what has
caused the productivity diﬀerences.
In industries where the share of purchased inputs in output is large and
may diﬀer signiﬁcantly across countries, we have used value added as the
output measure, and this applies to the retail case we describe later. Value
420 Martin Neil Baily and Eric Zitzewitz3. This approach is similar to the hedonic approach pioneered by Griliches.
added is not the favored output measure among productivity economists,
who prefer to use a production function with gross value of production as
the output and materials as one of the factor inputs. The McKinsey analy-
ses do use the production function as the central conceptual framework
for explaining productivity diﬀerences at the production process level, but
we do not estimate formal production functions. The concept of value
added is intuitive to business consultants whose own work is often based
on the value chain concept. Where possible we try to carry out a double
deﬂation estimate of value added, using purchasing power parity (PPP)
for inputs as well as outputs. That is often hard to do, and the estimates
are subject to error.
10.1.1 Quality
Because our analyses have largely been of cross-sectional comparisons
at a point in time, we have been able to avoid the problem of changing
quality over time. Where, based on industry knowledge, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
quality diﬀerences across countries in a given year, we try to control for
those diﬀerences. For example, in autos, we had access to conjoint studies
carried out in the United States and Europe that estimated the quality
premiums of Japanese and European nameplates over U.S. nameplates.3
In services, a recent example of quality adjustment for telecom service in
Brazil had to account for the diﬃculties of noisy connections as well as
the inability to place a call. In this case we estimated the investment in
equipment that Brazil would have to make to bring its service quality up
to the U.S. level, and we eﬀectively reduced capital productivity and hence
TFP to reﬂect this adjustment. A purer alternative would have been to
estimate the price adjustment that would have made consumers indiﬀerent
to the diﬀerent service levels (the conjoint approach). We did not have the
data to do this. Moreover, the answers would likely have been very diﬀer-
ent for the United States and Brazil.
The quality adjustment is not always done in an unbiased way—for
example, suppose we ﬁnd that Country A has productivity that is twice as
high as Country B using a raw output number, and that service quality is
somewhat higher in Country A. Lacking a quantitative adjustment that
can be made with reasonable resource cost, we may decide to ignore the
quality diﬀerence on the grounds that it will not change the overall analysis
of the causes of the productivity diﬀerences much.
10.1.2 Interaction between Measurement and Causality
A basic tenet of scientiﬁc research is that data collection should be inde-
pendent of the hypothesis being tested by the data. A double-blind clinical
Service Sector Productivity Comparison of TFP 4214. Because our focus is on productivity comparisons, our method does not generally iden-
tify ways in which best practice could improve. Our use of the term best practice does not
imply that we think such improvement is impossible.
trial of a new drug is a standard example. Economists try to follow the
same rules by using standard government data or by collecting data in
an objective or arms-length manner. Though sensitive to the demands of
rigorous hypothesis testing, the McKinsey studies have not operated in the
same way. We are not generally testing some aspect of economic theory.
Instead, we are trying to provide our best estimate of both the magnitudes
of the productivity diﬀerences among industries in diﬀerent countries
and the explanations for those diﬀerences at the production process level.
When a McKinsey team working on one of the case studies reports to us
that there is a productivity gap of, say, 40 percent between the U.S. and
another country, we do not accept that ﬁgure until the team has made
plant visits and has talked to experts in the industry and found supporting
data to explain at the operational level why the productivity gap occurs.
What is diﬀerent about the check-clearing process, for example, that can
account for a large labor productivity diﬀerence across countries.4 Some-
times, in that process, we discover that substantial adjustments must be
made to the productivity numbers. For example, we may ﬁnd that the
scopes of the industries are diﬀerent in the countries, or that some workers
employed by one industry actually work in another industry.
The drawback with this approach is that our analysis of causality at the
production process level is not true hypothesis testing. The advantage is
that we believe it provides much greater reliability. Subsequently, we do
attempt to test hypotheses at a diﬀerent level. Having determined the pro-
ductivity gaps and the reasons at the production process (or production
function) level, we then ask the higher-level question of why companies
operate diﬀerently in the diﬀerent countries.
The paper goes through each of the case studies in turn, attempting
to draw out the lessons for measurement. We conclude with a review of
the ﬁndings.
10.2 Retail Banking
Retail banking has undergone rapid changes in its competitive and regu-
latory environment since the early 1980s, and the fact that these changes
have varied in speed and intensity across countries makes it an interesting
industry in which to study their eﬀects. In the United States, the deregula-
tion of interest rates and money market checking accounts in the early
1980s increased competitive pressure on retail banks. The increased pres-
sure together with an increasing application of IT coincided with an accel-
eration in labor productivity growth (as measured by the BLS, ﬁg. 10.1).










































































































































































































s5. Ideally we would use total factor input in measuring productivity, but measures of the
physical capital involved in producing retail banking services (as distinct from the other
assets of a bank) are very diﬃcult to construct and make consistent across countries.















D)], which is the aver-
age of the two product-level productivity ratios, weighted by the labor share of the products








D), where the prod-
ucts of country A are weighted using the unit labor requirements in country B.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, competition and IT use were further
increased by the emergence of specialized processing and mortgage/con-
sumer loan companies, the liberalization of interstate banking, and the
emergence of a market for corporate control.
Outside the United States, the retail banking industry is typically more
concentrated, and the increase in competitive intensity in retail banking
has been less dramatic. In most countries, lower competitive intensity
has been accompanied by lower productivity, but the Netherlands has
achieved the highest productivity of the countries we have studied with
highly concentrated sectors. High concentration may have contributed to
high productivity by aiding in the development of an electronic payments
system and by reducing the pressure for expanding the branch network.
10.2.1 Productivity Measurement
The recent changes and cross-country diﬀerences in the banking indus-
try complicate productivity measurement. The traditional banking prod-
ucts included in the BLS output index (numbers of transactions and de-
posit and loan accounts) are easier to capture in physical measures than
are the newer products into which retail banks are expanding. Recent
changes in technology have also increased the cross-country and time se-
ries diﬀerences in the convenience with which banking products are of-
fered.
Measuring Output
We measure the overall output of traditional banking products using
a methodology similar to that of the BLS. We use our banking practice
knowledge to divide the employment5 involved in producing traditional
retail banking products into three functions: processing payment transac-
tions, maintaining deposit accounts, and lending. We then construct func-
tional productivity indexes and an aggregate productivity, which is the
average of the functional productivity measures weighted by employment.
This yields the same results as weighting outputs by the labor required
to produce them.6 This is the same procedure we use in the other service
industries with multiple outputs: airlines (RPK and passengers moved)
and telecom (access lines and call minutes). Using labor requirements as
weights is necessary because these outputs are usually not separately
424 Martin Neil Baily and Eric Zitzewitz7. This adjustment was originally motivated by the fact that in Sweden customers average
eight deposit accounts per capita (compared with 1.5 in the United States), mainly because
Swedish banks do not attempt to discourage low/zero-balance dormant accounts.
priced in a way that reﬂects their true cost. Just as airline passengers do
not pay separate per ﬂight and mileage charges, banking customers pay
for their deposit accounts in the form of an interest margin and usually
receive their transactions for free.
Deﬁning Output: Volume versus Value, Stock versus Flow
In following the BLS output measurement methodology, we have made
two important decisions about measuring output in banking that are
worth reviewing. We measure the number, not the value, of transactions
and accounts under the assumption that both the customer value and bank
input requirements are more constant per transaction/account than per
dollar value. This is obviously not completely true for any product, espe-
cially for lending, where large loans typically are reviewed more carefully
and provide a greater service to the borrower than do smaller loans. We
compensate partially for this problem by weighting loan and deposit ac-
counts by the cost factors estimated in the functional cost analysis, thus
capturing the fact that maintaining an average mortgage requires more
work than does maintaining an average credit card account, but not the
fact that high-value mortgages can require more work than smaller ones.
Another decision we made is to measure the stock of deposit and loan
accounts outstanding, rather than the ﬂow of new accounts. Because the
turnover of accounts is more rapid in the United States than in other coun-
tries and has become more rapid over time, this decision may understate
both the level and growth in U.S. productivity. Failing to capture the
higher account turnover is more justiﬁed in some cases than in others.
Some mortgage reﬁnancing is probably not positive net economic output
but can be viewed as a particularly ineﬃcient way of adjusting a ﬁxed
interest rate to market conditions. At the same time, some of the shorter
average life of mortgages in the U.S. is caused by higher mobility; the ac-
commodation of this mobility by the mortgage industry through a higher
loan turnover ratio probably does reﬂect additional output. Thus far, we
have only addressed this issue by adjusting downward the numbers of de-
posit accounts in countries that have a high share of unused dormant ac-
counts.7
Unresolved Issues: New Products and Convenience
In response to the increasing oﬀering of nontraditional banking prod-
ucts by retail banks, we attempted in a couple of projects to include physi-
cal measures of these products, such as the number of equity transactions
or mutual fund accounts. We abandoned these measures mainly because
Service Sector Productivity Comparison of TFP 425they produced implausibly low productivity levels for the U.S. securities
industry. About half a million people work in the U.S. securities industry,
most of whom are involved in functions other than the processing of trans-
actions and the maintenance of mutual funds. These functions are present
to a much greater degree in core ﬁnancial markets like the United States
and United Kingdom than in peripheral markets, but we have not found
a methodology for adjusting either the output or input ﬁgures to reﬂect
this diﬀerence. Other nontraditional banking products (such as insurance)
present similar problems.
Capturing diﬀerences in the convenience with which banking services
are provided is another unresolved issue in these productivity compari-
sons. The increasing penetration of ATMs, PC banking, and other delivery
channels has obviously increased convenience greatly over time. Fortu-
nately for our cross-country productivity measures, these changes have oc-
curred at a roughly similar pace throughout the advanced countries, and
our banking practice judged the level of convenience oﬀered in transaction
and deposit products to be roughly similar across countries.
Important diﬀerences in convenience do exist in lending, however. Infor-
mation technology has allowed lenders to centralize lending decisions, im-
proving the quality and timeliness of the decisions. Mortgage and other
loan decisions are now made in minutes rather than days, and better infor-
mation has allowed lenders to extend credit to more risky borrowers than
in the past. This technology was initially developed in the United States by
specialized lenders such as Countrywide Credit, whose growth helped en-
courage its adoption by the rest of the U.S. industry. Outside of the United
Kingdom, this technology has penetrated other countries more slowly, and
thus the convenience associated with rapid lending decisions (i.e., greater
availability of credit) is greater in the United States. We have not yet devel-
oped a good methodology for capturing this extra convenience.
10.2.2 Productivity Results
Overall we ﬁnd the Netherlands to have the highest productivity of the
countries studied, with the United States and France tied for second (table
10.1). The Netherlands leads the United States in all three functions, but
especially in processing payments. The Dutch advantage comes from the
combination of a more eﬃcient electronic payments system and an eﬃ-
cient branch network (table 10.2).
After adjusting for these two factors, the United States actually uses its
labor more eﬃciently, in part due to more centralization of processing and
use of part-time labor in the branches.
Electronic Payments
The development of the electronic payments system in the Netherlands
was led by the Postbank. When the Postbank introduced its electronic
426 Martin Neil Baily and Eric Zitzewitzpayments system, the other banks fought back by launching a joint alter-
native electronic payment system of their own. Their collaborative eﬀort
facilitated the development of standardized payment speciﬁcations that
are essential for eﬃcient electronic payment systems. In the Dutch case,
the banks’ joint eﬀorts led to the establishment of a unique IT format
adjusted for small payment transactions, a nationwide account numbering
system, and convenient payment vehicles such as electronic debit cards.
The end result has been widespread acceptance of electronic payments,
with high levels of eﬃciency and customer convenience in payments. Other
countries such as Germany and France also have Dutch-style electronic
payments systems, but these countries have lost this advantage through
dense branch networks (Germany) and ineﬃcient labor utilization.
The United States has had diﬃculty setting up shared electronic pay-
ments systems for two key reasons. First, the highly fragmented nature of
the U.S. retail banking industry, as well as state laws that have limited the
interstate activities of banks, have impeded the development of common
standards for IT and account numbering. Second, customers have been
reluctant to switch to electronic payments; Americans continue to rely on
checks for 70 percent of all transactions, perceiving them as safer and bet-
ter suited to record keeping than other payment vehicles. However, in the
countries that have recently started shifting over to electronic payments,
such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand, customers have been
given a small incentive to shift and have responded to that incentive. We
believe there is a substantial unexploited opportunity for the United States
to raise banking productivity and, once the transition has been made, to
increase customer convenience.
Branching
The consolidation of the branch network in the Netherlands is helped
by that country’s high population density and concentration. The density
of the Netherlands allows the banking industry to have 2.5 and 6 times
more branches per square kilometer of residential area than France or the
United States, respectively, despite having 45 percent and 30 percent fewer
branches per capita. The Dutch banks have not squandered this natural
Table 10.1 Labor Productivity in Retail Banking, 1995 (Index: U.S.  100)
Country Productivity Country Productivity
Netherlands 148 Australia (1994) 60
United States 100 Brazil 40
France 100 Colombia (1992) 30
Germany 85 Mexico (1992) 28
Sweden (1993) 80 Venezuela (1992) 25
Korea 71 Argentina 19
United Kingdom (1989) 64







































































































































































































































































































































































































.advantage (as the German and Korean banks have) by overexpanding
their branch network, in part because the high levels of concentration re-
duces the pressure to compete through branch proliferation. The absence
of regulations or understandings on pricing has also reduced the incentive
to focus on competing through branching.
Labor Organization
The U.S. industry has been most successful relative to other countries
in organizing its labor eﬃciently. The U.S. industry makes much greater
use of part-time labor to staﬀ eﬃciently for daily and monthly activity
peaks in the branches. Using part-time labor is more diﬃcult outside the
United States because of collective bargaining agreements or semivolun-
tary adherence to traditional labor practices. Greater penetration of IT
in the United States also allows the lending decision making, transaction
processing, and account maintenance functions to be centralized.
10.2.3 Lessons from the Banking Case
Two main implications for measuring productivity growth and levels
can be drawn from the banking case. The ﬁrst is that there have been
signiﬁcant increases in the eﬃciency of banks associated with the in-
creased penetration of IT. Our industry practice views the pace of change
as being at least as rapid as in manufacturing industries. At present the
BEA eﬀectively assumes away labor productivity growth in all ﬁnancial
services (changes in real output over time are set equal to changes in full-
time equivalent persons engaged in the sector). They could certainly im-
prove on that for retail banking by making use of the BLS banking produc-
tivity estimates (which show productivity growth of 4.5 percent per year
since deregulation in 1982). The second implication is that even the BLS
estimates may be missing changes in the true output of the sector. Some
of the increase in the turnover of accounts in the United States probably
represents increased true economic output; both the BLS and our measure
of output miss this increase. More importantly, the increased convenience
and availability of lending is not captured in these estimates.
10.3 Telecom
Our telecom case studies have all focused on the traditional, ﬁxed-line
residential and commercial services, which still account for about 80 per-
cent of telecom revenues. Data for mobile phones are included in the anal-
ysis, raising the coverage of the case study to roughly 90 percent of reve-
nue, but the overall results are still dominated by the ﬁxed line business.
The telecom industry essentially provides two outputs. The ﬁrst is access
lines, which provide access to the telephone network and the option of
making and receiving calls, and the second is the actual call minutes them-
Service Sector Productivity Comparison of TFP 4298. The capital involved in maintaining the network was impossible to separate from the
network capital but is a relatively small share of overall capital. Because the network mainte-
nance–related capital was included as providing call minutes, we may have slightly under-
weighted access lines relative to call minutes in constructing our output measure.
selves. These two outputs are priced and consumed at very diﬀerent rela-
tive levels across countries, and this complicates attempts to measure pro-
ductivity. For example, in Brazil the supply of access lines was restricted
by high import tariﬀs on capital goods and the government’s diversion of
telecom earnings to ﬁnance budget deﬁcits. As a result, access lines per
capita are very low given income levels (the black market rate for a line
has reached $5,000), but use of these lines is very high. In other countries,
such as Japan and Germany, access lines are easily available and monthly
fees are low, but calls are expensive and use is low. Aggregating the two
telecom outputs into a common productivity measure is one of the major
challenges of the case.
10.3.1 Productivity Measurement
Telecom is one of the three case industries with multiple physical out-
puts where the outputs are not separately priced in a way that reﬂects their
true cost or value to the customer. As in the other industries, we attempted
to aggregate the outputs using weights based on the inputs required to
produce them. Unlike banking, data for telecom is available for both labor
and capital input. Labor input in telecom is used primarily to maintain
and install access lines; only about 15 percent of the labor is used in activi-
ties where labor requirements are determined by call traﬃc. Capital, how-
ever, is mainly the switching equipment and lines that are used to provide
call minutes.
As in banking, we constructed our labor, capital, and TFP measures by
weighting outputs according to their input requirements. Labor productiv-
ity was measured as a weighted average of access lines maintained and call
minutes per hour worked, and capital productivity was measured as call
minutes per unit of network capital services.8 Labor and capital productiv-
ity were then averaged to form TFP, using weights based on the labor and
capital shares in value added. The advantage of this procedure is that it
produces both an acceptable overall measure of productivity as well as
component labor and capital productivity measures that are meaningful
to our industry audience.
Capital services are constructed using a perpetual inventory method
with sudden death depreciation. Capital is divided into four categories
(switching equipment, cable/wire, land and buildings, and general pur-
pose) and assigned service lives based on asset lives given by the Federal
CommunicationsCommission (FCC)to theRegional BellOperating Com-
panies. Capital expenditures are converted into U.S. dollars using PPPs
430 Martin Neil Baily and Eric Zitzewitzfor structures, equipment, and telecom equipment. That capital goods
tariﬀs caused access lines to cost $2,700 in Brazil instead of $2,300 does
not lower Brazilian capital productivity as measured. But Deutsche Tele-
kom speciﬁcations, which raised capital requirements 20 percent by call-
ing for main wires to be “tank proof” (i.e., able to survive being run over
by a tank) even when they are placed underground and requiring the use
of underground as opposed to aerial cables, do reduce German capital pro-
ductivity as measured. Capital productivity is also adjusted for service
quality. In Brazil, where service quality is lower due to the use of mechan-
ical and analog instead of digital switches and to lower switching capacity
per access line, we estimate the capital that would be required to upgrade
Brazilian service to U.S. standards (about 5 percent more capital per line)
and lower Brazilian capital productivity by this amount.
The main issue with using input requirements as a method for valuing
output is that they may not reﬂect the value of the output to the consumer.
The high black market price for access lines in Brazil suggests that adding
one million lines in Brazil would be more valuable than adding one million
lines in the United States. Likewise, a German consumer who is paying
four cents per minute for a local call is probably getting more value from
his or her average call minute than is the American with free local calling
whose teenagers gossip for hours to their friends.
To give one check of whether calls in the United States are of lower
value than calls in other countries, we looked at data on average call
length. We found that the average call length in the United States is about
the same as in Europe. Gossiping teens do not explain the usage diﬀer-
ences. Moreover, one point of view is that there are externalities associated
with telecom usage, where it drives productivity improvements elsewhere
in the economy. Another check of the results was carried out by the
McKinsey team in the United Kingdom, where a study was being carried
out as this paper was written. The team examined the share of telecom
revenues accounted for by payments for the access line and payments that
are determined by call-minutes. Data were collected for the United States,
United Kingdom, Germany, France and Sweden. As expected, the United
States has the largest share of revenues from access line charges (35 per-
cent), but the other countries’ shares are not all that diﬀerent. The lowest
is France, at 20 percent, where local calls are very expensive. The others
are Sweden 34 percent, United Kingdom 27 percent, and Germany 26
percent. Using the average revenue share of 28 percent to weight lines and
minutes gave productivity results that were pretty much the same as the
ones reported here.
The countries in which we have studied telecom productivity can be
roughly divided into three groups (table 10.3). The United States is the
only country studied that had both high labor and capital productivity,
which mainly reﬂect high access lines per employee and high network utili-



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































.zation, respectively. The United States had thus eﬃciently (relative to
other countries, at least) built and maintained a large network and
achieved high usage of that network. Most of the other countries studied
have achieved fairly high labor productivity but low network utilization.
Brazil, on the other hand, had low labor productivity, which resulted in
an insuﬃcient supply of access lines and thus high network usage. Before
privatization Argentina actually suﬀered from both low labor and low cap-
ital productivity, although labor productivity has recently improved.
Labor Productivity
Cross-country diﬀerences in labor productivity are due to diﬀerences
in the adoption of advanced technology such as digital switching and to
diﬀerences in the pressure to rationalize employment in order to take ad-
vantage of the new technology. In Brazil less than 50 percent of access
lines are digitally switched, compared with over 80 percent in the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.
Digitally switched lines require one-ﬁfth as much maintenance technician
time as analog lines to maintain, and Brazilian regional telecoms with
higher digitalization had lower cash (non capital, i.e., mainly labor) oper-
ating costs. In addition, less IT is used in Brazil in directory assistance and
customer service, which also leads to lower labor productivity.
New technology is important in enabling higher labor productivity, but
in countries that have adopted digital switching and other modern technol-
ogies, labor requirements per line have declined rapidly. In the United
States, for example, access lines per employee have grown at 7 percent per
year since 1980. In most cases this potential productivity growth is more
rapid than the growth in demand for access lines, and telecoms therefore
have to reduce employment in order to capture the full beneﬁt of the new
technology. In general, we have found that private telecoms facing at least
limited competition have been more likely than state-owned telecoms to
make these reductions. For example, the one private regional telecom in
Brazil has labor productivity that is 30 percent above average despite an
only average level of digitalization.
Capital Productivity
The most important factors explaining diﬀerences in network usage and
thus capital productivity are pricing and the availability and marketing of
demand-enhancing call completion services. The marginal pricing of local,
long-distance, and international calls is much lower in the United States
than in Germany, Japan, and Korea, and demand for calls per capita is
much higher. Most U.S. customers pay a higher monthly fee and receive
free local calls, whereas most other countries do not oﬀer free local calls
as an option. In addition, services that increase call origination and termi-
nation are more available and more aggressively marketed in the United
Service Sector Productivity Comparison of TFP 433States. Business call centers, voice mail, call waiting, and call forwarding
have much higher penetration in the United States than in other countries,
and the U.S. telecoms do not tax answering machines as Deutsche Telekom
does. Telecoms in the United States have historically expended much more
eﬀort and money marketing telecom services, whereas in other countries
there has been less focus on stimulating demand. In Germany advertising
has even carried the opposite message: Several decades ago Deutsche Tele-
kom ran advertisements advising consumers to “Fasse Dich kurz”—keep
it brief.
10.3.2 Lessons from the Telecom Case
The diﬀerences in the pricing and availability of telecom outputs across
countries provides evidence of how large the consumer surplus associated
with telecom services can be. Even when the rights to an access line were
trading at $5,000 in Brazil, there were seven lines per hundred population,
and almost all consumers could have sold their line on the black market
since the rights to a phone line were transferable. Thus roughly 7 percent
of the population valued a phone line at over $5,000 in a country with 22
percent of U.S. GDP per capita. This suggests that the consumer surplus
generated by the access lines that are available in the United States is sig-
niﬁcantly larger than the cost of building and maintaining the lines. Like-
wise, demand for local calls appears fairly inelastic above one to two cents
per minute; even though the price of local calls is 5 cents per minute, U.K.
consumers still demand over 1,300 minutes per capita. This suggests that
the consumer surplus from call minutes is also large.
We have not even begun to attempt to measure this consumer surplus,
although others have (e.g., Hausman 1997). The evidence in our case stud-
ies on pricing and demand across countries, however, suggests that under-
standing consumer surplus is important to understanding both telecom’s
ﬁnal output and its contribution to the output of other sectors.
10.4 Retailing
In a series of studies, McKinsey Global Institute has examined cross-
country comparisons of productivity and employment for general mer-
chandise retailing, food retailing, and a combination of both. In this paper
we will draw on the work that was done in the Netherlands, which covered
all retailing. It is not ideal to combine food and nonfood, although given
the presence of hypermarkets in Europe, it can be diﬃcult to separate
the two.
The importance of the retail sector to the national economy is often
underestimated. Yet, it accounts for 5 to 6 percent of GDP and 7 to 11
percent of employment in the United States and Europe. It is particularly
important in creating jobs for groups with high unemployment levels, em-
ploying relatively large numbers of women, young people, and people with
little education. The sector is also a major provider of part-time work.
434 Martin Neil Baily and Eric Zitzewitz9. Part of the diﬀerence in the gross margin-to-sales ratio can be explained by the fact
that mass merchandisers specialize in fast-moving, lower margin goods, but there are also
signiﬁcant cross-format diﬀerences in prices for the same categories or even the same items.
One can usually ﬁnd items more cheaply at mass merchandisers like Wal-Mart, but many
prefer a shorter drive and the greater availability of informed sales personnel in specialty
chains.
Because of this, our studies of retailing have often focused on employment.
The existence of very high minimum wages in Europe (eﬀectively about $8
an hour in France, given payroll taxes), together with zoning restrictions
that inhibit the development of high service retailing formats—notably
shopping malls with department store anchors and specialty chains—has
adversely aﬀected the creation of low-skill jobs.
10.4.1 Productivity Measurement
Format Evolution
Retail has undergone a major structural shift in the late twentieth cen-
tury, as traditional stores have been partially replaced, ﬁrst by department
stores and then by specialized chains, mass merchandisers, and mail order.
In order to understand the eﬀects of this structural shift on productivity
and employment in the sector, we have segmented the industry into six
diﬀerent store formats: (a) mass merchandisers, such as Safeway or Wal-
Mart; (b) out-of-town specialized chains, such as IKEA and Home Depot;
(c) in-town specialized chains, such as The Gap, Benetton, and The Body
Shop; (d) department stores, such as Saks, Bloomingdales, and Nords-
trom; (e) mail-order companies, such as Lands’ End; and (f) traditional
stores, such as bakeries and small hardware stores. E-commerce dealing
was not signiﬁcant at the time of the study.
These diﬀerent store formats oﬀer diﬀerent value propositions to their
customers. Mass merchandisers and, to a lesser extent, out-of-town spe-
cialty chains and mail order compete mainly by oﬀering low prices (table
10.4).
In-town specialty chains and department stores compete more by oﬀer-
ing high service levels, for example in the form of a targeted selection of
merchandise. The traditional stores that remain survive by oﬀering high
service, usually in the form of convenient locations. In general, mass mer-
chandisers and specialty chains are more productive than the other store
types, and in both the United States and Europe the industry is shifting
toward these formats.
Measuring Retail Service
The coexistence of in-town specialty chains with mass merchandisers
despite value added to sales ratios that are over twice as high can only be
explained if these specialty chains are providing extra service that custom-
ers value.9 Given that the level of service provided by retailers can diﬀer

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.10. For retail, gross margin and value added are essentially equal. In the exposition of the
methodology, we use the terms interchangeably in order to get concepts across more easily.
In calculating our results, we mainly used data on gross margin because it is more widely
available.
11. Actually, the Dutch team also used a third method that we are not reporting that
adjusts for format mix only. See McKinsey Global Institute and the Max Geldens Founda-
tions for Societal Renewal (1997).
12. One might have expected retailers to respond to high wages by substituting capital for
labor, but because structures and rent (the main component of capital in retailing) are also
more expensive in Europe, the main diﬀerence is the absence of marginal services in Europe.
so much, we rejected a simple throughput measure of retailing output. In
principle, what we would like to measure is the value added10 of retailers
at some set of international prices. But this is complicated. Retail prices
are available for food and general merchandise goods from the OECD and
International Comparisons Project (ICP) PPP projects, but these retail
prices are not usually collected in comparable formats (in part because
comparable formats do not always exist), and wholesale prices are harder
to obtain. As a result, double-deﬂated PPPs that truly reﬂect the cost (in
terms of the gross margin a consumer must pay) of retailing service are
essentially impossible to construct.
Because the ideal measure was not feasible, we considered two alterna-
tives.11 The ﬁrst was to use the PPP for consumption as a measure of the
“opportunity cost” of consuming retail service vis-a `-vis other consumer
goods and services. The rationale for using the consumption goods PPP is
that the general price level of all consumption goods should give one at
least an unbiased estimate of the price level of a speciﬁc consumption
good, retail service. The problem with this method was revealed when we
studied countries with very high relative retail wages (at PPP), such as
France and Sweden. High retail wages increase our measured labor pro-
ductivity for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that high wages encourage retailers
to forego providing marginal services, such as grocery bagging.12 By elimi-
nating jobs with low marginal labor productivity, average labor productiv-
ity should rise; this eﬀect we would like to capture in our measure. Unfor-
tunately, high relative retail wages also force up the relative price of retail
service, which causes our measure to overstate retail productivity. Because
we cannot construct a retailing service PPP, we cannot correct for this
eﬀect.
The retailing study made in the Netherlands attempted to overcome this
problem by using, essentially, a same-format PPP. It is based on the as-
sumption that the absolute productivity level of out-of-town specialized
chains is similar in the Netherlands and the United States, because the
retail concept applied in this format is very similar in the two countries.
This assumption implies that the service and eﬃciency levels (value added
per good and the number of goods sold per hour) are comparable, as is
productivity. We used the absolute productivity level of out-of-town spe-
Service Sector Productivity Comparison of TFP 437cialized chains as a bridge and combined it with relative format productivi-
ties within each country (captured by relative values added per hour for
the diﬀerent formats within each country) to calculate absolute format pro-
ductivities. We calculated retail sector productivity in each country by
weighting the absolute format productivity with the share in retail employ-
ment of each format. This method actually calculates relative productivit-
ies rather than retail outputs, but there is an implied relative output ﬁgure
computed by multiplying retail sector productivity by the number of hours
worked. The implicit assumption is that when a U.S. Toys “R” Us employs
more workers than a European Toys “R” Us to generate the same quantity
of sales, it is producing 30 percent more retailing service. Toys “R” Us
does provide more service in the United States; its opening hours are
longer; and check out lines shorter. However, it may be an overestimate to
say that extra employees translate into extra service one for one.
Unfortunately, the data were only available to apply this method to the
U.S. comparison with the Netherlands. This approach suggests a higher
relative productivity in the United States than does the regular PPP com-
parison. It may go too far and overstate the value of customer service in
the United States, but it does provide a new estimate of the quantitative
impact of the service component.
10.4.2 Productivity Results
The productivity results using the OECD PPPs indicate that retailing
productivity is pretty much the same among the European countries and
the United States. Using OECD PPPs, the productivity at the U.K., U.S.,
France, and German industries is 108, 105, 101, and 101, respectively,
with the Netherlands indexed to 100. This similarity reﬂects two oﬀsetting
forces. The United States has fewer low productivity traditional or mom-
and-pop stores (ﬁg. 10.2). Its low relative wages in retail allow for more
marginal services to be provided and may lower the relative price of retail
service, causing our value added at consumption PPP to underestimate
U.S. productivity.
The result of the United States–Netherlands comparison using the for-
mat bridge approach raises U.S. relative productivity by about 15 percent.
This could be an overstatement of the diﬀerence. As we noted earlier, com-
parable formats tend to have higher staﬃng levels in the United States,
and the bridge assumption implicitly says that the additional staﬀ have
the same average productivity as the intramarginal employees. That likely
overstates their productivity, and the true U.S. productivity ﬁgure is
probably between these two estimates.
Although productivity levels are fairly similar in the United States and
Europe, U.S. retailing output and employment are 50 to 80 percent higher.
Higher output is only partly due to 20 to 40 percent higher U.S. consump-
tion of retailed goods. The U.S. format mix is shifted toward more service-



































































































































































7intensive formats such as in-town specialty chains, and U.S. stores provide
more service in a given format—in the form of longer opening hours, more
sales assistance, shorter checkout lines, and so on. The less output and
employment-intensive European format mix is partly due to zoning laws
that prevent the development of shopping centers where in-town specialty
chains can be successful. The lower employment and service levels within
given formats is mainly due to high minimum wages and social costs,
which cut oﬀ the lower edge of the employment distribution. This results
in fewer open checkouts, no queue busters, shorter opening hours, less
cleaning of the stores, fewer customer representatives, and no bag packers.
10.4.3 Lessons from the Retailing Case
The McKinsey retail practice told us back when the original service
sector study was carried out some years ago that this industry in the U.S.
is highly competitive and innovative. Aggregate data that suggested weak
productivity growth in retailing seemed implausible to them and suggested
that the data may be missing the shift in U.S. retailing employment toward
specialty and higher service retailing formats where throughput per em-
ployee is low. The most obvious sign of this is the rapid growth of shopping
malls. Ever since, we have been trying to capture the productivity diﬀer-
ences that occur in cross-country comparisons because of the very diﬀer-
ent evolutions of retailing in the United States and other countries.
We believe that the format bridge approach is an appealing way to ap-
proach the problem. The PPPs are based on eﬀorts to compare like goods
to like goods. We have tried to compare like retailing service to like retail-
ing service. As long as these bridges are competing in a major way in
markets in the diﬀerent countries, they can provide a PPP equivalent.
The lesson for the measurement of output and productivity over time in
the United States is not a new one. Retailing is a service industry, not just
a conveyor belt to bring the goods to customers. Fueled by the availability
of cheap land and low wage labor, and facilitated by format evolution and
information technology, the United States has sharply increased its con-
sumption of this retailing service. Parts of the retailing sector have sought
competitive advantage through low prices or convenience, whereas other
parts oﬀer specialized inventories, advice and luxurious surroundings. We
are not aware that current price and output measures attempt to capture
the way in which the quality of retailing service has changed over time.
The productivity measure from the McKinsey Netherlands team was just
a start, but it suggested that the impact of service quality diﬀerences may
be quantitatively signiﬁcant.
10.5 Public Transportation
Almost all of the McKinsey industry case studies have been of indus-
tries in the market portion of the economy—that is, where market-based
440 Martin Neil Baily and Eric Zitzewitz13. All told, the McKinsey Global Institute has studied eight service industries (airlines,
banking, ﬁlm/TV/video, public transportation, restaurants, retail, software, and telecom) and
twelve goods-producing industries (auto, auto parts, beer, computer hardware, construction,
consumer electronics, furniture, metal working, processed food, semiconductors, soap and
detergents, and steel). We have conducted country studies of Australia, Brazil, France, Ger-
many, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
transactions and pricing typically prevail.13 This was mainly by design;
productivity comparisons are much more diﬃcult where there is not a mar-
ket valuation of output, and McKinsey’s experience has traditionally been
in the market economy. Recently, however, our European consulting prac-
tice has been developing more expertise in nontraditional areas like the
provision of public services. Given the privatization and reform of public
services that have taken place in Europe in recent years, our Netherlands
oﬃce felt that these services might represent an important area of improve-
ment potential for the Dutch economy. We selected public transportation
as an industry in which output was relatively straightforward to measure
yet had also been historically sheltered from market forces in the Nether-
lands.
10.5.1 Productivity Measurement
In the telecom case we deﬁned output as including both the use of tele-
com services (call minutes) and the creation of the option to use telecom
services (access lines). Public transportation is another industry in which
the provision of an option to use services is an important component of
output. Two half-full buses running a route every thirty minutes represent
more output than a full bus running a route every hour. Even though the
same number of people travel, those that traveled had more choices about
when to travel, and thus experience a higher degree of convenience. This
higher convenience is similar to that associated with having phone lines
in every apartment (rather than a common phone in the hallway), more
frequent ﬂight connections due to a hub-and-spoke system, faster turn
around times on a mortgage, or a conveniently located retail shop with
exactly the fashions you want to buy.
Assigning a value to more convenient service is at least as diﬃcult in
public transportation as it is in other services. In retail, one can observe
the margins paid in discounters and more focused specialty retailers that
compete for the same customers and attribute the diﬀerence in margin to
the extra value oﬀered by the specialty store. But in public transportation
more convenient and less convenient systems do not compete directly, and
even when they do, fares are usually not as “market-determined” as are
margins in retail.
As in the other industries (telecom, banking, and airlines) in which we
have had diﬃculty deriving a market valuation of convenience, in public
transportation we approached this issue from the input requirement side.
In public transportation, labor input requirements are most directly deter-
Service Sector Productivity Comparison of TFP 441mined by the vehicle kilometers of service oﬀered, not the passenger kilo-
meters consumed. We collected data separately for four diﬀerent modes of
passenger transportation (long distance train, metro/subways, trams, and
buses) in order to test for possible mix eﬀects.
Ad i ﬃculty in comparing productivity across countries is that city size
and structure can inﬂuence the viability and eﬃciency of public transpor-
tation. In order to ensure that these diﬀerences were not driving the results,
we compared ﬁve cities with similar populations, sizes of bus/tram/metro
networks, and roughly similar population densities: Amsterdam, Rotter-
dam, Stuttgart, Zurich, and Stockholm. The city results broadly con-
ﬁrmed the results we obtained at the country level.
10.5.2 Productivity Results
Sweden had the highest productivity at the country level, and Stock-
holm had by far the highest productivity in our city comparison (table
10.5). The Netherlands placed ﬁfth out of seven in our country compari-
son, ahead of only France and Germany, whereas Rotterdam and Amster-
dam were third and ﬁfth out of ﬁve in the city comparison. The Swedish
productivity advantage was so large that despite higher service frequencies
and lower usage, passenger kilometers per hour worked were also higher
in Sweden (table 10.6).
Why was Sweden more productive? Two possibilities were that Sweden
had a more productive mix of modes or that Sweden was obtaining higher
labor productivity at the expense of low capital productivity. But Sweden
had signiﬁcantly higher productivity in both long-distance trains and in
buses/trams/metros, and the productivity diﬀerences across buses/trams/
metros were insigniﬁcant. Annual loaded hours per vehicle were roughly
the same in Sweden and the Netherlands (18 percent higher and 13 percent
lower in trains and buses/trams/metros in Sweden, respectively), sug-
gesting that capital-labor substitution did not account for the diﬀerences.
The most important reason that labor productivity was higher in Swe-
den was simply that labor was more eﬃciently utilized. Driver, mainte-
nance, and overhead labor were 30 to 50 percent lower per vehicle-hour
in Stockholm than in Amsterdam or Rotterdam. In Amsterdam only 35
percent of paid driver time is actually spent driving, compared with 59
percent in Stockholm. In addition, average driving speeds are higher in
Stockholm due to lower levels of congestion and higher penetration of
high-speed rail.
Part of the diﬀerence in labor utilization is due to work rules. Work rules
in public transportation are designed to provide security and protection
for employees and passengers; but if applied too rigidly, these rules can
have the side eﬀect of lowering productivity. For example, in the Nether-
lands drivers are permitted a ﬁfteen-minute break every four hours of driv-
ing to reduce fatigue and improve safety. When buses operate on hourly































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.schedules, however, tight adherence to this rule can reduce labor usage
signiﬁcantly because the actual running time of the route can only be
forty-ﬁve minutes. Otherwise, the ﬁfteen-minute break every four hours
would throw oﬀ the entire schedule. Allowing one ﬁve-minute break every
hour would both provide more break time and increase productivity. In
addition to this rule, Dutch public transportation is also subject to numer-
ous other rules, mandating, for example, a ﬁve-minute boarding/mounting
time, a twenty-minute turn-out time, a four-minute walking time after
breaks, a second paid break after seven hours of accumulated working
time, and in some locations (including Amsterdam) a ﬁf t e e n -t ot w e n t y -
minute end-of-the-line break. In Sweden, unions have allowed work rule
revisions that enhance productivity in exchange for higher pay, and drivers
have an incentive to contribute to higher utilization due to performance-
based wages.
The emphasis on productivity in Sweden can be traced partly to in-
creased market competition. Since 1989, local and regional bus, tram, and
metro services have been exposed to competition through competitive bid-
ding for three- to ﬁve-year concessions for parts of local/regional networks.
The essential feature of this system is that local governments ﬁrst decide
on the service frequency desired, and then the operators compete on the
cost to fulﬁll these service requirements. To minimize entry barriers in the
operation of services, the local authorities have split the incumbent public
transportation companies into two parts: One, which remains closely re-
lated to local government, is responsible for planning and designing the
network, owns the rolling stock, and runs the bidding process for speciﬁc
concessions. The other part of the incumbent companies was split into
operational companies that compete for the concessions. Around 70 per-
cent of bus, tram, and metro services are now managed this way in Swe-
den. Similar bidding systems have been put in place in other high produc-
tivity countries: the United Kingdom and Japan. Labor utilization and
productivity have increased more rapidly in countries in which market
competition has been introduced, and service frequencies have generally
increased, not decreased as might have been feared. From 1980 to 1995,
productivity increased 71 and 45 percent in the United Kingdom and Swe-
den, both of which introduced market competition, but increased only 20
and 12 percent in the Netherlands and France, which did not.
10.5.3 Lessons from the Public Transport Case
Public transport provides another example of a service industry that
produces outputs that are diﬃcult to value at market prices. In this indus-
try, as in banking, telecom, and airlines, productivity measures can be
developed by assuming that the economic value of a standardized output
is related to the input required to produce it. What we learn from our
public transportation case (and from banking, telecom, and airlines) is
Service Sector Productivity Comparison of TFP 44514. Even prior to deregulation there were elements of a hub-and-spoke system, as busy
airports such as Atlanta or Chicago were frequently points of plane changes. However, regu-
lation prevented the full development of the system with multiple hubs and complete spokes.
that meaningful measures of cross-country output and productivity can
be developed using relatively simple methodologies; that is, they result in
measures of productivity that are consistent with what detailed knowledge
of the production processes in the industry would lead one to expect.
10.6 Airlines
The airline industry is only a small part of the economy, but it is one
that is studied intensively. It is an industry that provides some useful les-
sons about the eﬀects of regulation and government ownership and the
impact of changes in the quality of service. In particular, customer value
in this industry is driven heavily by the ability of airlines to provide fre-
quent service between any two destinations. In the United States this has
meant that once the industry was deregulated, the major airlines soon
found it essential to their competitive positions to develop the hub-and-
spoke system.14 This system results in some obvious congestion costs. As
multiple ﬂights arrive together at a hub, passengers ﬁnd a congested termi-
nal; ground personnel have to service the planes all at the same time; and
air traﬃc controllers face take-oﬀ and landing delays. The European in-
dustry has only recently been deregulated, and indeed is still not fully
competitive, so it has been slower to develop hub and spoke. But the same
forces are now driving that industry also.
10.6.1 Productivity Measurement
The main international productivity comparison was between a sample
of nine U.S. airlines (America West [HP], American Airlines [AA], Conti-
nental [CO], Delta [DL], Northwest [NW], Southwest [SW], Trans World
[TW], United [UA], and US Airways [US]), and eight European airlines
(Air France [AF], Alitalia [AZ], British Airways [BA], Iberia [IB], KLM
[KL], Lufthansa [LH], SAS [Scandinavian; SK], and Swissair [SR]). As
part of our studies of Brazil and Korea, we have also looked at productiv-
ity in the airlines of these two countries (Varig, VASP, Transbrasil, TAM,
and Rio Sul [a subsidiary of Varig] for Brazil; and Korean Air and Asiana
for Korea). We will discuss brieﬂy the productivity ﬁndings for these indus-
tries also and how they diﬀer from the United States and Europe.
We have estimated both labor and capital productivity, allowing an esti-
mate of total factor productivity for the industries. For capital productivity
we consider only the capital services from airplanes. The main reason for
excluding IT and ground equipment is the diﬃculty in obtaining reliable
numbers. Also, IT and ground equipment amount to only a small fraction
446 Martin Neil Baily and Eric Zitzewitz15. Average stage lengths are much longer for airlines like Qantas and Singapore Airlines.
This is one reason why studies that use only RPK as an output measure can yield mislead-
ingly high relative productivity for these airlines.
of the total physical capital stock of an airline (approximately 25 percent).
We estimate the current market value of all the planes of the carriers in-
cluded in this study and depreciate it over the remaining lifetime of the
plane (maximum lifetime  25 years). Leased aircraft are treated the same
as purchased aircraft. The physical output for capital productivity is reve-
nue passenger kilometers (RPK).
For labor productivity we followed a business activity approach that is
natural for business consultants and is quite revealing in terms of diagnos-
ing the reasons for the productivity diﬀerences, but that is not a standard
approach among economists. Each functional group of employees was as-
signed an output measure reﬂecting the particular tasks they were engaged
in, and the productivities of each employee group were weighted by labor
shares, as in banking and telecom. For cabin attendants we used RPK; for
ground handling and ticketing we used number of passengers ﬂown; and
for pilots and maintenance we used hours ﬂown. Because the two products
of “getting onto the plane” and “being ﬂown X kilometers from point A
to point B” are not separately priced, this approach (which is equivalent
to weighting the functional outputs with unit labor requirements) provides
an automatic adjustment for diﬀerences in stage length. In this way it is
better than the traditional method of using only RPK, because this ap-
proach captures the fact that three 1,000-mile ﬂights are typically priced
higher, require more input, and provide more customer value than one
3,000-mile ﬂight. We did check our results, however, using an overall mea-
sure of RPK per employee; and because average stage lengths are not very
diﬀerent across the countries we studied,15 we obtained roughly similar re-
sults.
The labor productivity numbers are adjusted for diﬀerences in degree of
third-party outsourcing of ground handling, ticket sales, and maintenance
among the comparison countries. We also excluded cargo-only employers
to be consistent with our output measures. The data used throughout this
case study are drawn from international aviation databases and reports,
including statistics provided by the International Air Transport Associa-
tion (IATA) and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). The infor-
mation for Brazil was also obtained from the Departamento de Aviacao
Civil (DAC).
10.6.2 Productivity Results
Table 10.7 shows the labor, capital, and TFP results for Europe, Brazil,
and Korea, with the United States indexed to 100 for 1995. We found that
the European airlines operated with about two-thirds the labor productiv-
Service Sector Productivity Comparison of TFP 44716. British Airways, the European carrier that has been privatized and that competes
against U.S. carriers, has productivity comparable to the U.S. airlines.
ity of the United States; Brazil had productivity less than half; but Korea
had the same level of productivity as the United States. When MGI com-
pared the United States to Europe in an earlier study, we found that Euro-
pean labor productivity was 79 percent of the U.S. amount. Moreover,
the earlier study estimated productivity on a per-employee basis without
adjustments for the diﬀerences in hours worked per full-time employee—
an adjustment that would have raised European productivity. Although
the sample of airlines was somewhat diﬀerent in the earlier study, these
ﬁgures suggest that Europe has fallen further behind the United States in
the six-year interval after 1989.
The gaps in capital productivity, reﬂecting diﬀerences in RPK per plane,
were much smaller, with the United States and Europe being essentially
the same, and Brazil at almost 80 percent of the United States ﬁgure. Data
on the stock of planes in Korea was not available. The European airlines
are able to maintain about the same aircraft utilization as the U.S. airlines.
The load factors are lower in Brazil. The TFP ﬁgures give equal weight
to labor and capital, reﬂecting a rough estimate of the income shares in
value added.
Figure 10.3 shows the breakdown of the labor productivity ﬁgure into
the performance of the diﬀerent groups of workers.
The most striking diﬀerences in operations occur in the ground person-
nel, including handling, maintenance, ticketing, sales and promotion, and
other. As in the prior study, we found substantial overstaﬃng in these ac-
tivities, reﬂecting the legacy of state-owned companies, inﬂexible work-
rules that reduce multitasking, and weak competitive pressure for cost re-
duction.16 The airlines in Brazil have many of the characteristics of the
European airlines, only more so. Varig was state owned until fairly recently
and is now employee owned. It has received substantial tax breaks to
maintain solvency. Aggressive competitors such as TAM are entering the
domestic market, but slots and route allocations are controlled by the Air
Table 10.7 Airline Productivity, 1995 (U.S.  100)
Labor Capital
TFPa Productivity Productivity
United States 100 100 100
Europe 75 66 92
Brazil 61 47 79
Korea 100
Source: McKinsey Global Institute (1998a).
aTFP  (Labor Productivity)0.5  (capital productivity)0.5































































































































































































































































































yForce. Brazil also suﬀers from IT ineﬃciencies. Importation of IT was
prohibited for many years and remains costly. The Brazilian airlines in
1995 were behind Europe and the United States in using computers for
scheduling and load management.
The diﬀerences in maintenance productivity reﬂect in part the impact
of standardization. Having many planes of the same type (Southwest has
all 737s) gives an advantage in maintenance. The U.S. airlines are able to
reap economies of scale in maintenance, whereas Brazil has too few planes
and too many types of planes for eﬃcient operation.
We obtained less detailed information about Korea. Unlike many cases
in Korea there is ﬁerce price competition in the industry even though there
are only two players. This has driven down ticket prices (average domestic
air fares in 1995 were 13 cents per km in the United States, 19 cents in
Brazil, and 8 cents in Korea) and promoted cost reduction and eﬃciency,
at least in labor use. We have consistently found that intense price compe-
tition in an industry is the best way to force high productivity, but it is not
always true that having two competing companies is suﬃcient, as appar-
ently it is for Korean airlines.
10.6.3 The Impact of the Hub-and-Spoke System
Shortly after deregulation freed managers to restructure their networks,
the U.S. industry moved to a hub-and-spoke network. By the mid-1980s,
the hub-and-spoke system had already revolutionized the U.S. airline in-
dustry; and at the end of the decade, U.S. airlines operated about 30 hubs
that, in terms of ﬂight pattern and frequency, produce a diﬀerent output
than do nonhub airports.
The hub technology is distinguished from the operation of a large air-
port or homebase like Frankfurt or London-Heathrow by the coordination
of the incoming and outgoing ﬂights and the resulting ﬂight pattern. Sev-
eral times during the day, waves of ﬂights come in and leave again about
60 to 90 minutes later. In between passengers from any arriving ﬂight can
transit to a connecting ﬂight. In 1989 for instance, Northwest’s hub in
Minneapolis/St. Paul had about eight waves or banks per day with the
biggest departure peaks at about 9:00 .., 1:00 .., and 6:00 .. to 7:00
.. The arrival peaks were roughly one hour earlier.
The transition created by the 1978 deregulation of the U.S. airline indus-
try has sometimes been characterized as a shift from a linear system of
direct nonstop and one-stop ﬂights to a hub-and-spoke system involving
connections at a set of central points where passengers are exchanged
among ﬂights. This is misleading because the frequency of passengers
making connections barely changed, from 28 percent in 1978 to 32 percent
in 1993 (Morrison and Winston 1995). Instead, what happened was that
major carriers that had previously established hub operations serving a
restricted set of spokes were allowed to increase the number of spokes
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carriers (some previously small regional airlines) established competing
hubs that came to be dominated by a single carrier, sometimes as the result
of a merger between two carriers previously serving the same hub. As the
largest carrier in each hub city expanded into all the feasible spoke cities,
competing airlines that previously had possessed protected rights on those
routes were forced to abandon them. The result was the virtual elimination
of interline connections, which in 1978 had represented 14 percent of all
passengers and half of all connections. The remaining two-thirds of pas-
sengers who did not make connections in 1993 were served, as in 1978, by
an abundance of nonstop ﬂights on busy city-pair markets, both short-
haul and transcontinental, and by nonstop ﬂights on many new routes to
spokes from the several new hubs.
The transformation of the U.S. airline industry to the hub-and-spoke
system was driven by demand and revenues, rather than by cost. Given
the traﬃc dispersion in the United States and given customers’ desires for
frequency between origination and destination cities, the hub-and-spoke
technology is the only economical way to oﬀer fast and frequent air trans-
portation at times convenient to most of the travelers. Consequently, the
carrier that could oﬀer an advanced hub-and-spoke network could attract
more customers and gain a competitive advantage over its competitors.
Whereas the hub-and-spoke system has increased service quality and
variety for most of the customers (particularly higher frequency of ﬂights),
we think that this innovation has generally had a negative impact on mea-
sured labor and capital productivity, given that we are not able to measure
the added customer value as an output. The productivity price for the hub-
and-spoke technology is extremely peak-driven operations at the hub, with
unfavorable implications for labor and capital utilization. This means that
our physical output measures are missing an important qualitative aspect
of the U.S. airline industry—namely the overall network performance, or
the ability to provide frequent services to hundreds of destinations in a
reasonable time. To the beneﬁt of the consumer, this output quality is pro-
vided at the expense of higher factor inputs, without being captured in our
productivity measure.
10.6.4 Lessons from the Airline Study
The main implication for productivity measurement from our case study
is that improvements in the quality of service should be considered in a
correct measure of output for this industry. Airlines advertise the quality
of their food and the friendliness of their personnel (arguably attributes of
service that have deteriorated since deregulation), but it is MGI’s conclu-
sion from working with many airlines around the world that frequency and
reliability of service are the key factors in service quality, particularly
among business travelers. This means that the industry developed a major
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the beneﬁts of which were not captured in productivity measures. Quanti-
tative estimates of the productivity penalty associated with hub-and-spoke
or of the increased customer value from increased service would have been
valuable. Since the development of this system has been the principal
structural change occurring in this industry since 1980, it is likely that its
impact on true productivity has been substantial.
This conclusion bears on the debate about the impact of IT. As we have
seen from the experience of Brazil, operating a point-to-point airline with
inadequate IT exacts a productivity penalty. Operating a hub-and-spoke
system without IT would be impossible. The share of IT hardware in the
total capital stock of the industry is small. The impact of the technological
change facilitated by IT has been large.
10.7 Summary and Conclusions
The ﬁrst step in correctly measuring the output of an industry is to
understand that industry: how it is changing and how this change is being
driven by consumer demand. Although we have used relatively simple
measures of output in the service industries we have studied, we have gen-
erally been able to satisfy ourselves that the resulting productivity compar-
isons make sense in terms of what is going on at the production process
level and how the industries are evolving.
In banking, we found that an index of output, based on the three main
functions of retail banks, performed pretty well as an indicator of relative
performance. An important lesson from this work is that shifting to elec-
tronic funds transfers has a very large impact on productivity. In general,
MGI has found that increased competition improves productivity, but
banking in the Netherlands provides one example where a relatively con-
centrated industry was able to make the shift in technology more easily.
Hopefully, government coordination through Federal Reserve actions will
accomplish the same goal in the United States while maintaining competi-
tive intensity.
Despite the useful lesson from the simple output measure in banking,
the case illustrates the limitations of our measurement. An important
change in the mortgage industry has been the introduction of streamlined
processes and computerized credit assessments. This has reduced the inter-
mediation margin and speeded up the approval of loans. Neither of these
changes in cost or in quality is captured in our output measure or in others
that we know of. Further, the growth of the securities industry has been
very rapid. Much of the activity consists of selling services and giving
investment advice, and the intrinsic value of both activities is hard to
value. An additional issue has arisen when we have extended our analysis
to countries such as Korea, whose banking system allocated loans without
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problem even prior to the current crisis. Measuring banking output on the
wholesale side would pose new challenges.
The banking case gave clear evidence of the importance of IT on pro-
ductivity. ATMs, check processing equipment, use of terminals to access
information, call centers, loan processing, and of course electronic funds
transfers are all important in this industry.
Looking forward, we anticipate substantial changes in the retail banking
industry. It is possible that the main functions currently carried out by
banks will migrate to other institutions. To an extent this has already hap-
pened, as specialized lending institutions have taken over large parts of
the credit card and mortgage markets. Retailers already provide ATMs,
credit cards, and cash-back services and may expand to oﬀer most or all of
the current services provided by banks. Unless measurement approaches
evolve with the industry, errors may worsen in the future.
In telecom there are three main attributes of service in developed coun-
tries: the access line, the call minutes, and the mobility of the call. We were
able to capture two of these. Clearly, as Hausman (1997) has shown, it
would be possible to capture the value of the third element. We have our-
selves explored a hedonic or conjoint approach to the problem in which
we would be able to price mobility, given the alternate pricing schemes in
eﬀect in diﬀerent countries, but we did not complete the task. In the devel-
oping country context, problems such as noise on the line, lack of call
completion, and cutoﬀs become important elements in service quality.
They remind us that over the long term, service quality has greatly in-
creased in the United States.
Going forward, we expect that new technology will allow major im-
provements in service variety and quality. High-speed data transmission
will allow new services to be provided. It is likely that phone service with
picture as well as sound will improve in quality and become more common.
The phone companies will soon allow people to have a single number and
have calls that track the location of the person. (Hopefully one will be able
to switch such services oﬀ as well as on.)
Information technology, notably digital switching, bill processing, and
cellular service, has been important to productivity in this industry. It will
be central to the changes in service going forward.
Retail has been the industry where measurement has been most diﬃcult
for our studies to resolve satisfactorily. This is one of the largest industries
in the United States. It has changed dramatically over time, and employ-
ment has grown. It is a sector where consumers clearly value its output.
The evolution of retailing formats from traditional stores to discounters,
category killers, and high-service specialty stores has transformed the in-
dustry; indeed, it has transformed the cities and suburbs. Given the diﬃ-
culties we have experienced in our cross-country comparisons, we are in
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measurement problem. However, we know there is a problem that needs
to be solved.
The continuing trend in the industry is that discounters invade the prod-
uct and service lines that are started by innovations among the specialty
players. This lowers prices to consumers and passes back to them the bene-
ﬁts of innovation, a process familiar in all industries. Without new mea-
surementmethods,however,productivitygrowth willcontinuetobeunder-
stated.
Information technology has played an important role in this industry in
allowing retailers to eliminate the wholesale function and work directly
with manufacturers. IT speeds checkout and tracks inventory. It allows
companies to track demand and focus on the items consumers want.
Adequate tracking and benchmarking of public services can provide a
spur to improved performance in the public sector. The Netherlands study
made benchmark comparisons of public transportation services produc-
tivity, revealing the very high price paid by riders in Amsterdam for the
work rules and restrictions in place in that city. Given the size and impor-
tance of the public sector, such benchmarking studies have tremendous
potential importance.
Recent improvements in BLS tracking of discount fares have improved
the measurement of prices and hence real output in the airline industry.
Now that the hub-and-spoke system is ﬁrmly in place, changes in service
frequency and reliability may or may not be major factors in service qual-
ity change going forward. In order to understand the historical develop-
ment of productivity in the industry, however, it would be essential to fac-
tor in the eﬀect of this innovation.
This industry has been adjusting to the impact of deregulation over the
past several years. New entry has changed the competitive intensity and
forced major restructuring. That process continues and it may or may not
induce new innovations in service quality going forward.
Information technology was an important element in overall productiv-
ity for the industry. It allows for more eﬃcient use of resources and means
that companies can operate with the increased complexity of hub and
spoke.
10.7.1 Common Themes
For the purposes of international comparisons, we have concluded that
simple physical output measures work surprisingly well. These output
measures can be related to the inputs used in their delivery, as we saw
in banking, telecom, and airlines. We can make adjustments to the basic
measures for quality diﬀerences, or we can ignore those that do not seem
to make a substantive diﬀerence to the overall conclusions we reach about
the causes of productivity diﬀerences. The one case where a simple physi-
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any other way.
Analyses of these case study industries suggest that the simple output
measures will be much less adequate for productivity growth over time.
The knowledge that MGI can oﬀer in this area is to point to the most
important drivers of industry change. If the data collection techniques in
use are not capturing the impact of industry evolution, then they are likely
to be substantially in error. We have seen plenty of evidence of the impor-
tance of quality change and convenience.
A possible general approach to improving the measurement of these
convenience and quality changes is to measure and value convenience-
related customer time savings and to use hedonics to estimate market valu-
ations of service quality diﬀerences where possible. Developing exact pro-
cedures will obviously require further study, but our cross-country ﬁndings
suggest that quality and convenience are potentially very important
sources of error.
All of the cases, with the possible exception of public transportation,
showed that IT was a vital component of the industry business systems.
Based on what we learned of these industries, the value of computer hard-
ware was only a small component of total capital and, on a growth ac-
counting basis, IT would make only a small contribution to labor produc-
tivity. Nevertheless, we found that the current business systems in these
industries would be impossible without IT. A substantial increment to pro-
ductivity is associated with its use. Brazil, which had speciﬁc regulations
about IT purchases, and had productivity limited by inadequate IT in air-
lines and banks illustrates this point.
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The Baily-Zitzewitz paper continues the tradition of the McKinsey Global
Institute in displaying admirable creativity and imagination to overcome
seemingly intractable obstacles to making valid cross-country compari-
sons of levels of productivity. We emerge from the analysis with both new
measures of the extent of productivity diﬀerences across countries in ﬁve
industries and considerable understanding of the underlying sources of
these diﬀerences. In this comment I begin by extracting from the paper
some of the most interesting generalizations about the sources of cross-
country productivity diﬀerences and subsequently discuss what we learn
(and do not learn) about the “lessons for measurement” previewed in the
paper’st i t l e .I nt h eﬁnal section of this comment I oﬀer a few thoughts
about the treatment of airlines. To preview what comes later, my main
quibble about the paper is that the lessons for measurement are directed
more at the consulting community than at the practitioners of productivity
measurement in national statistical oﬃces; we learn less than one might
hope about how some of the insights from the industry studies can be
applied to the measurement of the time series evolution of productivity,
either at the level of these ﬁve industries or for the economy as a whole.
Generalizations about the Sources of High Productivity
Perhaps the most striking of the paper’s conclusions is that there is no
single national model for achieving the highest productivity in every indus-
try. Unlike the earlier McKinsey Global Institute study of the service sec-
tor (1992), in which the United States seemed to emerge as the clear leader
in most industries, here the leadership role is shared, with the U.S. clearly
ahead only in telecom and airlines, the Netherlands in banking, Sweden
in public transport, and an ambiguous verdict in retailing (subsequently
we return to the measurement issues speciﬁc to retailing). Another com-
mon theme that runs through the Baily-Zitzewitz paper is American ex-
ceptionalism, which has mixed implications for productivity, from back-
wardness about electronic payments in the banking industry; to admirably
high usage of telephone lines; to a retailing system driven by low-cost land
and lenient land-use laws; to public transit that is so nonexistent that it is
not worthy of study in the paper; to a set of large airlines beneﬁtting from
e c o n o m i e so fs c a l et h a ti np a r tr e ﬂect national geography, dispersed fami-
lies, a common language, and lenient regulation of mergers.
Implicit in the paper’s case studies is the generalization that government
policy is capable of both harm and good. Some of the harm is created by
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search fellow of the Center for Economic Policy Research.that age-old enemy of eﬃciency, namely high tariﬀs, evident in the paper’s
emphasis on the distorted prices of imported capital goods that hinder
the development of the Brazilian telecom industry. Work rules in public
transportation are another government-imposed source of ineﬃciency, as
in the example of ineﬃcient Dutch public transport contrasted with Swe-
den’s. Shop closing hours and zoning restrictions are among the regula-
tions cited by Baily and Zitzewitz to explain the more advanced develop-
ment of mass-merchandising retail formats in the United States compared
with Europe. Labor market regulations restricting the development of
part-time employment interact with shop closing hours to reduce the con-
venience (and consumer surplus) enjoyed by European consumers com-
pared to their American counterparts.
However, there are important measurement and policy issues that are
implicit in the discussion of retailing but that never rise to the surface in
the Baily-Zitzewitz presentation. Mass merchandisers achieve higher gross
margins and sales per employee than do older formats and help the United
States achieve its productivity advantage in retailing, but this has been
achieved by a systematic and controversial set of U.S. government policies
that has encouraged the development of metropolitan areas that by Euro-
pean standards have very low population densities. The most important
policies that have steered the United States resolutely toward low density
and high dispersal are the massive investment in interstate highways,
which in most metropolitan areas have no tolls or user charges; the starva-
tion of investment in public transport; the tax deductibility of mortgage
interest payments, which encourages overinvestment in houses and large
lots; and the dispersed governmental system, which permits local zoning
regulations that restrict the minimum lot size in many suburban jurisdic-
tions. Low density imposes numerous costs on American society that are
hidden in standard productivity measures, including excessive investment
in automobiles and highways that consume resources to an extent that
is unnecessary in European cities, and the time and aggravation costs of
suburban road congestion and long travel times from home to work. Thus
the criticism of European zoning regulations for inhibiting the develop-
ment of modern retailing formats implicit in the Baily-Zitzewitz paper
must be set against the costs of low-density suburban development, which
remain unmeasured either by the authors or in oﬃcial measures of pro-
ductivity.
The contrast between the European system and American system has
increasingly attracted the interest of academic economists in recent years
(see, for example, Gordon 1997). Low minimum wages and a relatively
light burden of social security taxes in the United States greatly boost the
wage for the marginal unskilled American employee, especially in the re-
tail sector, and lead to rapid growth of employment in types of jobs that
scarcely exist in some European countries, particularly grocery baggers
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cashiers, and valet parking attendants. Thus in the U.S. retail sector two
opposing forces aﬀect productivity in retailing compared with Europe: The
low-density suburbs and lax regulations on land use encourage the rapid
development of mass merchandising and out-of-town specialty formats,
boosting the level of productivity, whereas the heavy use of unskilled low-
wage workers for grocery bagging and other tasks reduces productivity
(while creating unmeasured increases in consumer convenience).
Far from causing universal harm to productivity, government policies
can actually be the source of good. The much more advanced use of elec-
tronic transfers by the European banking system, and the quaint back-
wardness of the U.S. banking system, is traced by the authors partly to the
role of the Netherlands Postbank in taking the lead in electronic payments
and forcing privately owned banks to follow. Also important in explaining
U.S. backwardness is the set of government regulations that until recently
prevented interstate banking and created an ineﬃcient system of thou-
sands of unit banks. Even to this day, a wire transfer into or out of my own
personal bank account is a rare event, almost always involving a payment
coming from a European source, and the instructions for making a wire
transfer to my account are so complex that seven lines of text are required.1
Another lesson for policymakers, especially in the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, is that in some cases a high level of concentration encourages eﬃ-
ciency by reducing administrative overhead and encouraging innovation,
w h e r e a sl o wl e v e lo fc o n c e n t r a t i o nc a nl e a dt oi n e ﬃciency. Although pri-
marily implied by the Baily-Zitzewitz study of banking, this conclusion is
true for the European airline industry, where ﬂeet sizes of particular air-
craft types are too small to beneﬁt from economies of scale in aircraft
maintenance.
Measurement Issues
The Baily-Zitzewitz paper grapples imaginatively with the issue of mea-
suring output in industries with multiple unpriced outputs, such as bank-
ing and telecom. They combine volume measures of such functions as tele-
phone access lines and call units, or in the case of banking, processing
458 Martin Neil Baily and Eric Zitzewitz
1. The reluctance of U.S. businesses to use electronic transfers extends far beyond the
banking system itself. No credit card or other national merchant that sends me bills includes
codes on the bill for electronic payment. For years I used an electronic bill-paying system
run by Fidelity Investments, which allowed me to avoid writing checks but which required
Fidelity to print computer-written checks and physically mail them to merchants. I aban-
doned this system because the mailing addresses and postal box numbers of the merchants
changed so rapidly that keeping Fidelity informed of the changes became a headache com-
pared to the old-fashioned method of sticking a check in a window envelope with a pre-
printed payment stub. Further, at least half my checks are written in idiosyncratic transac-
tions that would not be worth setting up merchant numbers and account numbers for simple
one-time payments to local merchants or workmen (all of whom would have electronic ac-
count numbers printed on their invoices if located in the Netherlands).payment transactions, maintaining deposit accounts, and lending. Weights
to combine the separate types of outputs are based on estimates of labor
requirements rather than on costs or revenue shares, and the authors ap-
peal to lack of data rather than theoretical purity to justify their choice.
In some industries, especially airlines, there is enough data to run a regres-
sion to separate the per-passenger part of the fare from the mileage compo-
nent, but the drastic change in the weight of these components after U.S.
deregulation (with the per-passenger charge rising to reﬂe c tc o s ta n dt h e
per-mile component declining substantially) reminds us that revenue
weights in some industries and eras may be a reﬂection of regulations more
than the basic economics of the industry.
We can assess the methodology in the Baily-Zitzewitz paper both within
its own context, providing a consultant’s expertise on the sources of pro-
ductivity diﬀerences across countries, and on the more ambitious goal set
forth in the paper’s introduction, “to ask whether the results of these inter-
national comparisons cast any light on the problem of service sector out-
put measurement.” I have few objections to the case studies themselves. A
purist might object that adjustments are introduced in an ad hoc way, as
in the 5 percent adjustment for the lower quality of telecom service in
Brazil. Symmetry would require a substantial adjustment to the productiv-
ity of European airlines for the higher labor requirements of ground han-
dling caused by the costly necessity of separating domestic and interna-
tional operations, and for additional expenses of remote ticket oﬃces
required by diﬀerent languages and the more complex ticketing require-
ments of international tickets. I ﬁnd adjustments in some industries and
not others and wonder whether the results would be aﬀected much (if at
all) if the adjustments were equally thoroughgoing in each industry.
The paper is less successful in its broader ambition of providing lessons
for the measurement of productivity in the services sector at the level of
national statistical agencies. The central problem is that the basic mission
of statistical agencies is to measure the level of labor productivity and
multifactor productivity for their own economy over a time span con-
sisting of many years and decades. Yet the paper never delves into the
implications of its own analysis for the growth rate of productivity over
time. For instance, the authors state that “even the BLS [U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics] estimates may be missing changes in the true output of
the sector,” yet no attempt is made to substitute the authors’ methodology
in banking for that of the BLS or to measure the diﬀerence made by the
two methodologies over, say, the last decade.
The authors’ lack of interest in time series issues extends even to their
unwillingness to use past evidence gathered in McKinsey (1992) to mea-
sure changes over time in the industries that both studies looked at:
namely, banking, telecom, retailing, and airlines. The authors missed the
opportunity to take their current weights and their measures of outputs
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current study, and to calculate annualized growth rates in productivity for
the years between the two sets of data, and then to have compared and
analyzed diﬀerences in these growth rates from those computed in oﬃcial
data for the same industries, for example, by the BLS and similar sources
for other countries. For instance, how rapidly would their measure of tele-
com productivity of access lines and call units increase compared to the
current BLS estimate that output per hour in the U.S. telecom industry
grew at a rate of 5.4 percent per annum and the U.S. commercial banking
industry at a rate of 3.1 percent per annum over the time interval 1987–96?
Another measurement issue closely related to the Baily-Zitzewitz anal-
ysis of retailing emerges in the Boskin commission report on the U.S. Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI), the so-called output substitution bias. There are
two extreme views regarding the diﬀerence in retail prices across retailing
formats. At one extreme, the oﬃcial view of the CPI is that any diﬀerence
in price between, say, a ma-and-pa neighborhood drug store and Wal-
Mart is entirely reﬂected in a diﬀerence in service. If the arrival of a new
Wal-Mart in town causes the price of toothpaste to drop from $2.59 at the
old-format store to $1.49 at the Wal-Mart, the entire price diﬀerence of
$1.10 must be due to the superior service and location of the old-format
store. This is implicitly the view of Baily and Zitzewitz, who state, “We
believe that the format bridge approach is an appealing way to approach
t h ep r o b l e m ....W eh a v et r i e dt oc o m p a r el i k er etailing service to like
retailing service.”
At the opposite extreme is the view that the entire price decline of $1.10
in this example represents a price decline, with no diﬀerence in quality,
and that the CPI is biased upward for ignoring this decline in price and
attributing the entire diﬀerence in price to a diﬀerence in service quality.
The Boskin Commission report seemed to adopt this position, although
when pressed, most commission members including myself would assume
that the truth lies somewhere between the two positions rather at the lower
extreme of ignoring any diﬀerence in service quality.
Here, however, I would like to diﬀer with both the CPI and the Baily-
Zitzewitz paper. There are three persuasive reasons to believe that con-
sumers view most of the price reduction available “when Wal-Mart comes
to town” as a true reduction in price rather than as a reduction in service
quality. By far the most important reason is that consumers have been
voting with their feet and their autos, ﬂocking to Wal-Mart. The market
share of discount department stores rose from 44 percent to 68 percent
between 1988 and 1998 as consumers chased the lower prices. If lower
prices had been completely oﬀset by lower service quality, there would
have been no shift in market shares. Second, there is no diﬀerence in ser-
vice quality between the newer-format mass merchandise discount stores
(Wal-Mart, Target, Kmart) and the older-format department stores that
cater to the same customers (Sears and Montgomery Ward). All these
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a customer shifts from old format to new format. The basic reason that
the new-format stores charge lower prices is that they are more eﬃcient,
with innovative electronic inventory management systems pioneered by
Wal-Mart and Target stores. Faced with this competition and ﬂeeing cus-
tomers, Montgomery Ward and Woolworths went bankrupt, further evi-
dence that their price diﬀerential was not supported by superior service.
Third, new-format stores may actually provide superior service. A front-
page article in the Wall Street Journal (24 November 1999) traced part of
the customer preference for Wal-Mart compared with Sears to the avail-
ability of shopping carts at the former but not the latter, and the ability to
do all checking out on a single stop at exit checkout aisles in the new-
format stores, instead of at separate islands in each department. This is
reminiscent of the process by which grocery supermarkets made individual
butcher and produce shops obsolete by combining lower prices with single
rather than multiple checkouts.
When discussing upward bias in indexes of consumer prices, by far the
most elusive area is the consumers’ surplus provided by new products. At
one point Baily and Zitzewitz allude to several ingredients that would help
in the construction of a measure of the consumers’ surplus provided by
telephone communication, including the fact that rights to an access line
in Brazil were trading at $5,000 in a country with only 22 percent of the
value of U.S. real GDP per capita, and that U.K. customers demand over
1,300 annual minutes per capita at a price of 5 cents per minute, indicating
that U.S. customers enjoying free local calls are enjoying a substantial con-
sumers’ surplus. The frustrated reader vainly hopes that the authors will
work out these implicit calculations and express them as a ratio to total
consumption or real GDP, but the reader receives no help from the au-
thors and wonders whether 1,300 annual minutes  $0.05 (i.e., a mere $65)
actually warrants the adjective “large.” Also, we do not learn whether the
total cost of phone calls in the United States is less, or whether there is
just a redistribution between light and heavy users implied by a higher
access charge and lower unit cost in the United States as contrasted with
the United Kingdom.2
The Airline Industry
Because airline management is my particular area of industry expertise,
I will conclude with a few comments on the paper’s treatment of airlines.
The current paper is more sophisticated than the related study of airlines
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2. Also, the presumption that local calls are typically free in the U.S. may be an obsolete
observation. Local phone service in the United States has become inordinately confusing,
with multiple telephone bills for the same phone line; and on inspection of my phone bill for
October 1999, I discovered that for my main home phone line I had no free call privileges
but instead was charged at a rate that averaged $0.0338 per minute, hardly diﬀerent from the
author’s quoted rate for the United Kingdom several years ago.in the McKinsey (1992) volume but still requires a few comments and
corrections.3 The authors distinguish the U.S. hub technology, which they
agree started before deregulation in 1978 but further developed (by open-
ing new hubs and ﬁlling in missing spokes in old hubs) by the mid-1980s,
from a “large airport like Frankfurt or London-Heathrow.” They seem to
imply that the major home bases of the large European airlines are some-
thing diﬀerent than the hub-and-spoke system operated by the U.S. air-
lines. The only sense in which their comment is correct is that London-
Heathrow is so constrained by slot limitations that of necessity arrivals
and departures are spread evenly over the day and do not exhibit the peak-
ing of scheduled banks of ﬂights characteristic of U.S. hubs, which (other
than Chicago O’Hare) are not subject to slot controls. But the other large
European airports were operating hub-and-spoke systems by the early
1970s that were much more developed in the United States simply because
by deﬁnition each large European airline had landing rights between its
home base and each outlying spoke, whether in Europe, the United States,
Asia, Africa, or Latin America. Because the only two U.S. airlines oﬀering
substantial service to Europe at that time (TWA and PanAm) funneled
their passengers through New York’s Kennedy airport, for many residents
of U.S. cities like Chicago or San Francisco, the best and fastest way to
get to most cities in Europe was to ﬂy on a foreign airline to its hub,
whether London, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Zurich, or Paris, and continue
on that same airline to the spoke city (Lisbon, Rome, etc). Today Amster-
dam, Frankfurt, and Paris De Gaulle are large hubs with all the character-
istics of the major U.S. airports that Baily and Zitzewitz describe, with
banks or waves of ﬂights arriving periodically, and idle periods in between.
Amsterdam and De Gaulle each have six banks of ﬂights daily, fewer than
O’Hare, Atlanta, Minneapolis, and other large U.S. hubs; and the peaking
of ﬂight operations is evident in Amsterdam between 8:30 .. and 10:30
.., when seventy-ﬁve jets depart, or in Frankfurt from 12:30 .. to 2:00
.., when a like number of jet departures occur.
There is no argument with the authors’ conclusion that the development
of U.S. hubs was driven by demand and revenues and is doubtless cost-
ineﬃcient by peaking baggage sorting and other ground operations and
leaving idle periods between. The cost ineﬃciency is particularly evident
at smaller hubs like Northwest Airlines’ operation at Memphis, with just
three banks per day; and so costly are small hubs with infrequent banks
that American Airlines closed down three of them (San Jose, Nashville,
and Raleigh-Durham) in the early 1990s. My quibble is that this does not
represent a diﬀerence between the United States and Europe, either for
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3. I was a discussant of the published article drawn from the Baily (1992) study. The discus-
sion of airlines in the current study adopts many of the suggestions made in my earlier com-
ment, particularly about the nature of the transition of the U.S. route structure after deregu-
lation.the larger European hubs discussed here or the smaller hubs like Brussels,
Zurich, Copenhagen, and Milan.
The major omission in the airline case study is the failure to recognize
that at least some of the higher labor requirements of European airlines
are due to the inherently more international nature of their operations.
The typical European airline has a far greater percentage of its ﬂights that
cross borders to another country than does the typical U.S. airline and
thus faces physical barriers within airports that require duplicate staﬀ for
domestic and international ﬂights. The Schengen agreement that has lifted
passport controls among many European countries has, if anything, made
the situation more complex and labor intensive. The Frankfurt airport was
required to build a whole new set of third-ﬂo o rl o u n g e ss ot h a ti tc o u l d
service the same gates from a second-ﬂoor lounge if extra-Schengen and a
third-ﬂoor lounge if intra-Schengen; and passengers are frequently re-
quired to travel by bus to aircrafts that are parked at jetways and could
have been reached by foot through the regular concourses but for the rules
that require bypassing passport control stations. The extra control person-
nel and bus drivers may in some cases be on the payroll of the airlines and
others on the payroll of airports, but they doubtless account for some of
the European airlines’ ineﬃcient labor use.
Finally, part of the European airlines’ ineﬃciency is due to diﬀerences
in language across the continent. On one visit I found that Lufthansa had
two people working in Florence, Italy, in a ticket oﬃce servicing one ﬂight
per day. Not surprisingly, Baily and Zitzewitz show that Europe’s worst
functional productivity ratio is in ticket and sales personnel. Why doesn’t
United Airlines, which serves places like Burlington, Vermont, with two
or three ﬂights per day, have a ticket sales oﬃce in those cities? Most of
the diﬀerence must be due to language. German travelers in far-oﬀ Flor-
ence want the security blanket of a Lufthansa oﬃce where they can speak
German if they want to change their plans or reconﬁrm their reservations.
Airlines in the United States do all this with monolingual continent-wide
toll-free numbers.
These observations do not imply that the paper made mistakes in its
analysis of airlines, but rather that it omitted some of the sources of the
U.S. productivity advantage. Just as it is a time-honored principle of eco-
nomics that tariﬀs breed ineﬃciency, so too it is a time-honored source of
the century-long American productivity advantage that numerous indus-
tries, especially in transportation, beneﬁt from the economies of scale im-
plicit in a continent-wide zone free of barriers to the movement of people
or goods and able to communicate in a common language. Perhaps the
greatest surprise suggested by the current paper is that Americans remain
so steadfastly backward in writing checks instead of carrying out their
ﬁnancial transactions electronically. The second greatest surprise, not dis-
cussed explicitly in the paper, is that Europe has raced far ahead of the
Service Sector Productivity Comparison of TFP 463United States in mobile phone technology and usage by agreeing to a
single standard, instead of the four competing standards in the U.S. cellu-
lar phone industry. Sometimes, it makes sense for the government to im-
pose industry concentration and uniformity.
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